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CONGRESS, CAVE BUGS, COURTS AND THE COMMERCE
CLAUSE: DID THE FIFTH CIRCUIT FIGURE OUT HOW
TO REGULATE INTRASTATE ACTIVITY UNDER
THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT?
I. INTRODUCTION
The ever-increasing demand for commercial and residential
development confirms that if natural resources and species are not
protected, they will soon be destroyed.' Failure to protect the vari-
ous species that inhabit our nation will inevitably invite large-scale
ecological disaster because of the interdependence between species
and ecosystems. 2 Congress attempted to respond to this danger by
1. See Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(1) (2000) (stating Con-
gress' conclusion that "various species of fish, wildlife, and plants in the United
States have been rendered extinct as a consequence of economic growth and de-
velopment untempered by adequate concern and conservation."); GDF Realty
Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 639-40 (5th Cir. 2003) [hereinafter GDF Realty
I] (implying continued failure to protect species against development will result in
continued extinctions and implying failure to regulate endangered species takes
will result in piecemeal extinction).
2. See Shankar Vedantam, Reports on Global Ecosystems Calls for Radical Changes,
WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 2005, at A2 (explaining that experts concluded in Millen-
nium Ecosystem Assessment that world's ecosystems are in danger and might not
support future generations unless radical measures are implemented to revive and
protect them); see also Neil Cunningham & Mike D. Young, Toward Optimal Environ-
mental Policy: The Case of Biodiversity Conservation, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 243, 247 (1997)
(arguing that preserving biodiversity is essential to maintenance of human life on
earth because species and ecologies are interdependent). Gunningham and
Young argued:
Ecosystem diversity refers to the variety of habitats and communities of
different species that interact in a complex web of interdependent
relationships.
Biodiversity is essential for the maintenance of human life on earth, and
scientists have long acknowledged that the preservation of biodiversity is,
by definition, vital for an ecologically sustainable society. Humanity de-
rives much of its food, medicines, and industrial products from both do-
mesticated and undomesticated components of biodiversity. Biodiversity
is also an important source of natural ecosystem processes that are benefi-
cial yet often grossly undervalued, such as water purification, soil fertiliza-
tion, and groundwater recharge. Furthermore, loss of genetic diversity
could frustrate needed improvements in agriculture.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See also Mary Gray Davidson, Protecting Coral Reefs: The
Principal National and International Legal Instruments, 26 HARV. ENVrL. L. REv. 499,
515 (2002) (recognizing "growing knowledge that an individual species does not
exist independent of its surroundings; rather, an ecosystem is a community in
which all parts are interdependent"); see, e.g., Gibbs v. Babbit, 214 F.3d 483, 497
(4th Cir. 2000) (quoting Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbit, 130 F.3d 1041, 1059
(D.C. Cir. 1997) [hereinafter NAHB] (Henderson, J., concurring) ("[g]iven the
(309)
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enacting the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA), which pro-
vides substantial, if controversial, protection to endangered species
and their habitats within the United States.3
Of the approximately 1,082 species protected under the ESA,
half live in habitats existing exclusively in one state.4 Without the
ESA's protection, endangered species that reside solely in one state
risk imminent piecemeal extinction because states often do not ad-
equately protect them and development interests obscure the need
to preserve them.5 Indeed, many scholars, judges and scientists
agree that the threat of any species' extinction is a national prob-
lem demanding a national solution, i.e., federal legislative interven-
tion.6 Hence, the utility and necessity of federal legislation like the
ESA becomes evident, though not always well received. 7
The ESA and most federal environmental statutes are predi-
cated on Congress' power under Article I, section 8, of the United
States Constitution: the Commerce Clause.8 The United States Su-
preme Court recently restrained this broad power through the fol-
interconnectedness of species and ecosystems, it is reasonable to conclude that the
extinction of one species affects others and their ecosystems.")).
3. See Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (stating purpose of ESA is,
inter alia, to protect species susceptible to extinction because of increased demand
for development).
4. See NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1052 (discussing local nature of many endangered
species). That is, 521 of the approximately 1,082 endangered species reside in
only one of the 50 states. Id.
5. See, e.g., GDF Realty I, 326 F.3d at 644 (Dennis, J., concurring) (implying
that many states do not adequately protect endangered species and asserting that
extinction of endangered species is national problem requiring national solution);
id. at 640 (agreeing with the United States Fish and Wildlife Service's (FWS) argu-
ment that piecemeal extinction may result from failure to regulate Cave Species
takes). Texas, the home of the endangered species at issue in this case, is one such
state, though it has apparently taken steps toward protection. Id. at 644. Further,
states may lack resources to identify endangered species, or may be less likely to
protect them in some instances due to economic pressure and the need for devel-
opment, or may feel that they have just have bigger fish to fry.
6. See, e.g., Gunningham & Young, supra note 2, at 247 (stating that protection
of species and ecosystems is essential to sustaining human life); GDF Realty I, 326
F.3d at 639 (stating that extinction of species is national concern); Jud Mathews,
Turning the Endangered Species Act Inside Out?, 113 YALE. L.J. 947, 953-54 (2004)
(opining that extinction of species is problem of "truly national concern").
7. See JAMES A. PRITCHARD, PRESERVING YELLOWSTONE'S NATURAL CONDITIONS:
SCIENCE AND THE PERCEPTION OF NATURE (University of Nebraska Press) (1999),
available at http://www.nps.gov/yell/nature/pritchard/chap6a.htm (pointing out
controversy over ESA, but illustrating its success in protecting endangered
species).
8. See Christopher H. Schroeder, Environmental Law, Congress and the New Feder-
alism Doctrine, 78 IND. L.J., 413, 414 (2003) (citing examples of how some environ-
mental regulations may run awry of Commerce Clause). The "commerce power" is
Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause which allows Congress to regu-
late activity involved in interstate commerce. See U.S. CONST. Art. I § 8, cl. 3.
2
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol16/iss2/7
2005] CONGRESS, CAvE BUGS, COURTS AND COMMERCE CLAUSE 311
lowing two seminal decisions. In both United States v. Lopez9 and
United States v. Morrison,'0 the Court refused to hold that the Com-
merce Clause authorized federal regulation of intrastate crime and
imposed the requirement that when Congress invokes its Com-
merce Clause authority to regulate an activity, that activity must be
economic in nature." This recent diminution of the Commerce
Clause's reach could have a substantial impact on the constitution-
ality of federal environmental legislation pertaining to endangered
species protection because protecting such species may not always
entail "economic" activity.12
One of the most recent cases addressing the Commerce Clause
issue as it pertains to endangered species was GDFRealty Investments,
Ltd. v. Norton (GDFRealty 1). 13 The primary issue in GDFRealty Iwas
whether the ESA's "take" provision could constitutionally apply to
certain species that existed only in Texas and had no colorable ties
to any economic activity. 14 More abstractly, does the ESA's take
provision, as applied to takes of noneconomic, intrastate protected
species, fall within the purview of the Commerce Clause?15 The
Fifth Circuit upheld the take provision, utilizing the "aggregation
principle" and liberally applying the "economic regulatory scheme"
mechanism to establish that takes of an intrastate species with no
ties to commerce fell within the Commerce Clause's ambit.' 6 The
Fifth Circuit's decision seems brave in light of Morrison and the re-
cent wave of federalism under the current Supreme Court, but per-
haps appropriately so, for the sake of all species that do not enjoy
economic viability. 17
9. 514 U.S. 548, 563-68 (1995) (holding that Congress' Gun-Free School
Zones Act violated Commerce Clause).
10. 529 U.S. 598, 614-19 (2000) (holding that Congress' Violence Against Wo-
men Act violated the Commerce Clause).
11. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563-68 (introducing economic requirement); Morri-
son, 529 U.S. at 614-19 (applying economic requirement).
12. See Schroeder, supra note 8, at 414 (indicating that reduction of com-
merce power could result in setback for environmental legislation).
13. 326 F.3d 622, 624 (5th Cir. 2003).
14. See id. (reciting central issue). The ESA defines "take" as to "harass, harm,
pursue, hunt, shoot, wound . any member of any endangered species. 16
U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2000).
15. See GDF Realty I, 326 F.3d at 624 (discussing Commerce Clause issue).
16. See id. at 630, 638-40 (invoking economic regulatory scheme mechanism
to establish Cave Species substantial effect on interstate commerce); infra notes 29-
57 and accompanying text for a general explanation of the aggregation principle
and the economic regulatory scheme.
17. See id. at 640 (holding that ESA's take provision as applied to Cave Species
is valid, even under Lopez and Morrison).
3
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This Comment first briefly reviews Congress' Commerce
Clause power, focusing on the Supreme Court's seminal decisions
in Lopez and Morrison.18 The Comment then considers how some
federal circuits have dealt with Congress' diminished power as ap-
plied to environmental legislation. 19 With an overview of Congress'
Commerce Clause power, the Comment then explains the Fifth Cir-
cuit's GDF Realty I opinion. 20 Next, the Comment critically analyzes
the Fifth Circuit's use of the economic regulatory scheme mecha-
nism to establish how the Commerce Clause authorizes federal reg-
ulation of purely intrastate, noneconomic activity.21 Finally, the
Comment offers a view on the possible impact GDF Realty I
may have on environmental legislation directed at endangered
species. 22
II. RECENT COMMERCE CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
A. Introduction
The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution
grants Congress the authority to regulate, inter alia, "commerce
among the several states," commonly referred to as "interstate com-
merce. "23 Over time, courts broadly interpreted the term "inter-
state commerce" to include any activity that might have a
"substantial effect" on interstate commerce. 24 This broad interpre-
tation in turn expanded Congress' jurisdiction over activities that
were previously beyond its reach under the Commerce Clause.2 5
Since 1995, however, the Supreme Court has reigned in Congress'
ability to regulate various activities under the Commerce Clause
18. See infra notes 35-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of Lopez and
Momson.
19. See infra notes 58-71 and accompanying text for a discussion of how other
circuits have addressed Commerce Clause issues in the context of environmental
legislation.
20. See infra notes 79-148 for a detailed discussion of the GDF Realy I opinion.
21. See infra notes 149-210 for a critical analysis of the GDF Realty I opinion.
22. See infra notes 211-26 for a discussion of GDF Realty I's potential impact
on Commerce Clause jurisprudence and environmental regulation.
23. See infra notes 24-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Com-
merce Clause's scope.
24. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942) (allowing for regula-
tion of local wheat growing because it substantially affected interstate commerce);
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59 (affirming that if activity has substantial effect on inter-
state commerce, it can be regulated under Commerce Clause).
25. See infra notes 29-34 and accompanying text for a discussion on Congress'
Commerce Clause power before Lopez and Morrison.
4
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through its decisions in Lopez and Morrison.26 To convey the signifi-
cance of these cases and their potential effect on the ESA, the fol-
lowing section first briefly discusses Wickard v. Filburn,27 the seminal
Commerce Clause case prior to Lopez and Morrison; then, this sec-
tion sets forth the new limitations the Court placed on the Com-
merce Clause in Lopez and Morrison; and finally, this section surveys
various Commerce Clause challenges to environmental legislation
after Lopez and Morrison.28
B. The Commerce Power: Wickard, the Aggregation Principle,
Lopez and Morrison
Until 1995, Congress enjoyed a very expansive interpretation
of the Commerce Clause.29 Before 1995, Congress could regulate
many intrastate activities only tenuously linked to interstate com-
merce. 30 The most expansive interpretation came in Wickard v. Fi-
burn.3 1 The issue in Wickard concerned the limits Congress set on
the amount of wheat a local farmer could grow to prevent upsetting
the interstate wheat market, even though the farmer used the wheat
solely for personal consumption. 32 In simple terms, Congress justi-
fied its regulation on the premise that locally growing and consum-
ing one's own wheat, when aggregated with other similar instances,
reduced the national demand for wheat, thereby reducing its mar-
ket price and substantially affecting the interstate wheat market.33
26. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549-51 (rejecting federal regulation of gun control
around schools); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 598 (rejecting federal regulation of violence
against women).
27. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128-29 (allowing for regulation of local wheat
growing because it substantially affected interstate commerce).
28. See infra notes 29-71 and accompanying text for a discussion of historic
and recent Commerce Clause jurisprudence and Commerce Clause challenges to
environmental legislation.
29. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 553-58 (discussing how commerce power was ex-
panded until recently).
30. See id. (reviewing history of Commerce Clause jurisprudence).
31. Id. at 556 (explaining how Wickard was one of two cases marking pinnacle
of Congress' reach through Commerce Clause). In Wickard, a wheat farmer chal-
lenged legislation that regulated his ability to grow and consume his own wheat.
Wickard, 317 U.S. at 118-20. The farmer argued that Congress could not regulate
his activities because they were entirely local and were not involved in any com-
merce, let alone interstate commerce. Id. at 119. The Court held that the local
growing and consuming of wheat did substantially affect interstate commerce. Id.
at 127-29.
32. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 115-16 (explaining purpose of Agricultural Adjust-
ment Act of 1938 (AAA)).
33. See id. at 127-29 (holding that Congress' commerce power certainly ex-
tends to intrastate activity that, when aggregated, would substantially affect inter-
state commerce). Essentially, when farmers grow and consume their own wheat,
5
Koch: Congress, Cave Bugs, Courts and the Commerce Clause: Did the Fift
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2005
314 VILLANovA ENVIRONMENTAL LAw JouRNAL [Vol. XVI: p. 309
Wickard solidified the aggregation principle, which allows Congress
to combine a single, intrastate activity with other like activities to
find the requisite substantial effect on interstate commerce.3 4
In United States v. Lopez, the current Supreme Court set a sub-
stantial limit on Congress' commerce power by requiring that any
regulated activity be "economic" in nature to have the requisite sub-
stantial effect on interstate commerce.3 5 In Lopez, the Supreme
Court reversed the defendant's conviction for violating the Gun
Free School Zones Act of 1990, which prohibited the possession of
a gun within school zones.3 6 The Court reasoned the Act was un-
constitutional because criminal possession of a gun was not an "eco-
nomic" or commercial activity that substantially affected interstate
commerce.3 7 Because the Court did not consider gun possession to
be an economic activity, it refused to follow Wickard and aggregate
multiple instances of gun possession to find that, in the aggregate,
it substantially affected interstate commerce.3 8 The Court ex-
plained that if Congress could aggregate a clearly noneconomic ac-
tivity, it would result in a carte blanche grant of federal police
power to Congress.3 9 Unwilling to do this, the Court declared Con-
they affect the demand for wheat because they no longer need to buy it. Id. at 128-
29 ("[h]ome grown wheat in this sense competes with wheat in commerce."). If a
large number of local wheat consumers grow their own wheat, this would substan-
tially affect the interstate wheat market because the market would lose several
participants.
34. Id. at 127-28 (explaining the aggregation principle).
35. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-60 (discussing economic requirement for activity
to have substantial effect on interstate commerce). Lopez summarized the means
through which an activity could be regulated under the Commerce Clause: (1)
Congress may regulate any activity that made use of the channels of interstate com-
merce, (2) the instrumentalities of interstate commerce and, most controversially,
(3) if the activity "substantially affects" interstate commerce. Id. at 558-59.
Whether an activity is economic is relevant only to the third prong; an activity
presumptively does not substantially affect interstate commerce if it is not eco-
nomic in nature. See id. at 560-62, 567 (explaining that Court will uphold regula-
tion if activity is economic and explaining how piling on inferences is insufficient
to reach substantial effect because, unless nexus between noneconomic activity
and interstate commerce is blatant, Congress must present findings supporting
link to interstate commerce).
36. See id. at 551 (explaining reversal of defendant's conviction). The Gun-
Free School Zones Act of 1990 prohibited "any individual knowingly to possess a
firearm at the place that [he] knows.., is a school zone." Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104
Stat. 3266, 4844 (1990).
37. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568 (explaining that gun possessor was local student
at local school and that possession of gun is not commercial or economic).
38. See id. (refusing to aggregate where activity was not economic).
39. See id. at 564 (discussing drawbacks of unlimited aggregation power). Es-
sentially if Congress aggregated anything enough times, almost any activity would
have some kind of inferential connection to interstate commerce. See id. There-
fore, some kind of check or limitation is needed - hence the requirement that
6
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gress should only aggregate economic activities, disapproving of
any link to interstate commerce that would require the Court to
"pile inference upon inference" to find a substantial effect.40
Significantly, Lopez carved out an exception under which a
facially noneconomic activity could be aggregated to establish that
it substantially affects interstate commerce.41 If an activity is crucial
to a larger economic regulatory scheme such that the scheme
would be undercut but for regulating the particular activity, the ac-
tivity could be considered "economic" for purposes of aggrega-
tion.42  For example, in Wickard, the Court explained that
regulating growth and consumption of one's own wheat was crucial
to the larger economic scheme of the Agricultural Adjustment Act
(AAA), which regulated production of wheat.43 Congress' inability
to regulate such activity would undercut the whole scheme because
local consumption of one's own wheat, when aggregated with all
other instances, would reduce market demand for wheat. 44 As
only economic activities can have a substantial effect on interstate commerce, and
only economic activities can be aggregated if a single occurrence of an activity is
not enough to establish a substantial effect. As the Court put it, "under [the Gov-
ernment's] 'costs of crime' reasoning . . .Congress could regulate not only all
violent crime, but all activities that might lead to violent crime, regardless of how
tenuously they relate to interstate commerce." Id. (alterations by author).
40. See id. at 563-64, 567 (refusing to pile on inferences to find substantial
effect on commerce). Congress argued that guns in schools posed a substantial
threat to the educational process, thereby threatening the learning environment,
which in turn would handicap the educational process, which in turn would result
in a less productive citizenry, which would then in turn affect the Nation's econ-
omy and interstate commerce. Id. The majority disagreed with this reasoning,
arguing that gun possession is not economic and required too many inferences to
reach a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Id.
41. See id. at 561 (setting forth alternative means an activity can affect com-
merce aside being economic); see infra note 46.
42. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (asserting that section 9 2 2(q) could not be regu-
lated on ground that it was "not an essential part of a larger regulation of eco-
nomic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the
intrastate activity were regulated."). The Court indicated that because section
922(q) was not essential to a larger regulation of economic activity (a regulatory
scheme), it could not be regulated "under our cases upholding regulations of ac-
tivities that arise out of or are connected with a commercial transaction, which
viewed in the aggregate, substantially affect[ ] interstate commerce." Id. This lan-
guage suggests that if an activity were essential to some larger regulatory scheme
involved in regulating some commercial activity, that activity could be aggregated
to find a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Id. Whereas, if no larger regu-
latory scheme were present, the activity has no real connection with any kind of
commercial activity, thus it will not be economic in nature and it could not, under
Lopez (and Morrison), be aggregated to find a substantial effect on interstate com-
merce. See id. at 560-61.
43. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 115-16, 127-29 (explaining aggregation principle).
44. See id. (explaining aggregation principle). Because regulating local growth
and consumption was apparently crucial to the proper functioning of the Act, the
7
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such, all instances of local wheat growing could be aggregated to
establish a relationship to interstate commerce.45 Lopez, therefore,
recognized two instances where it is appropriate to aggregate an
activity with other like activities to demonstrate that particular activ-
ity's effect on interstate commerce: (1) when the activity is eco-
nomic in nature, or (2) when the activity is essential to a larger
economic regulatory scheme such that the scheme would be under-
cut but for the regulation of the noneconomic activity.46
Five years later the Supreme Court decided United States v. Mor-
rison, reaffirming Lopez' new restrictions on the commerce power,
particularly the economic requirement. 47 The Court declared sec-
tion 13981 of the Violence Against Women Act unconstitutional,
holding that violent acts against women were not economic in na-
ture, and therefore, Congress lacked the power to regulate them
under the Commerce Clause.48
In addition, Morrison identified four factors relevant to deter-
mining whether an activity substantially affects interstate com-
merce. The first and most important factor is the economic nature
of the regulated activity.49 The Court essentially stated that only
economic activities should be regulated, even if a noneconomic ac-
tivity, after aggregation, arguably affects interstate commerce.
50
Court permitted its regulation. Id. at 127-29. Yet, it is important to note that the
Court considered growing local wheat to be an economic activity. Id.
45. See id. (explaining aggregation principle).
46. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-67 (setting forth criteria for determining
whether activity substantially affects interstate commerce); Adrian Vermeule, Does
Commerce Clause Review Have Perverse Effects?, 46 VILL. L. REv. 1325, 1332 (2001)
(asserting that Lopez ratified economic regulatory scheme as means to permit ag-
gregation and establish activity's substantial effect on commerce).
47. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617 (stating strongly that activities ought to be
economic if they are to be regulated). Significantly, in Morrison, the Court indi-
cated that it did not adopt a categorical rule against regulating any noneconomic
activity, but it did not elucidate grounds for when a noneconomic activity could be
regulated. Id. at 613.
In Morrison, the Court reviewed a student's claims under the Violence Against
Women Act of 1994, § 13981, against two students who allegedly raped her. Id. at
602-03 (citing facts and relevant statute). The Violence Against Women Act cre-
ated a civil statutory claim for compensatory and punitive damages against any
person who commits a violent crime motivated by gender. Id. at 605-06.
48. See id. at 610, 613, 618 (rejecting Government's argument that aggregate
effect of gender motivated violence substantially affected interstate commerce on
ground that activity was not economic and it robbed states of traditional power to
regulate intrastate violent crime).
49. See id. at 610 (stating factors in substantial effects analysis). The Court
relied heavily on this first factor in its reasoning, explaining that violence against
women was not an economic activity. Id. at 613, 615-18.
50. See id. at 617 (explaining that noneconomic activities are not proper sub-
jects of regulation). The Court stated "[w]e accordingly reject the argument that
8
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol16/iss2/7
2005] CONGRESS, CAvE BUGS, COURTS AND COMMERCE CLAUSE 317
The second factor concerns jurisdictional limits on the regulated
activity.51 The third factor considers any congressional findings
that support the link between the regulated activity and interstate
commerce. 52 Finally, the fourth factor considers the Lopez "attenua-
tion" principle; that is, whether the link between the regulated ac-
tivity and commerce is too attenuated to substantially affect
interstate commerce. 53
Morrison also buttressed the attenuation principle by declaring
that when analyzing whether Congress is regulating an activity that
falls within the Commerce Clause, congressional findings are only
suggestive, not dispositive. 54 By doing so, the Court reserved the
final determination of whether an activity affects commerce to it-
self, rather than deferring to Congress' findings. 55 In his dissenting
opinion, Justice Souter argued the majority's refusal to show defer-
ence to Congress' ample findings amounted to imposing a new
heightened standard of review on legislation based on the Com-
merce Clause.56 Whether Justice Souter was right or not, Morrison
suggests the Court will not easily defer to Congress if Congress at-
Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on
that conduct's aggregate effect on interstate commerce. The Constitution requires
a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local." Id. at 617-18.
51. See id. at 611-12. In other words, the second factor addresses whether the
statute regulating the activity poses any jurisdictional limits on the regulated activ-
ity. The Court held that the Violence Against Women Act had no saving jurisdic-
tional limits keeping it from exceeding Commerce Clause limitations. Id. at 613.
52. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612 (explaining that congressional findings would
be reviewed to help determine link between regulated activity and interstate
commerce).
53. See id. (discussing attenuation principle of Lopez, which states inferences
may not be piled upon inferences to establish link between regulated activity and
interstate commerce).
54. See id. at 614 (declaring that Congress' findings alone are not sufficient to
sustain regulations under Commerce Clause); id. at 615-16 (refusing to adopt Con-
gress' findings that gender motivated violence has substantial effect because rela-
tionship to interstate commerce was too attenuated and will result in federal police
power).
55. See Schroeder, supra note 8, at 417 (suggesting that Court would review
Congressional findings with greater scrutiny after Morrison, where traditionally def-
erential rational basis review applied).
56. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 636-38 (Souter, J., dissenting) (claiming that ma-
jority's statements that Congressional findings are not themselves sufficient to es-
tablish substantial effect, in addition to their argument that simply because
Congress may conclude that particular activity affects commerce does not make it
so, imposes improper heightened standard of review). In pointing to the extensive
evidence Congress amassed, Justice Souter declared the Court's formalistic refusal
to recognize the effect that "noneconomic" gender motivated violence has on in-
terstate commerce amounted to the judiciary no longer employing rational basis
review. Id. at 630-36 (Souter, J., dissenting).
9
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tempts to base a regulation of noneconomic activity on its Com-
merce Clause authority.57
C. The Deflated Commerce Clause and Environmental
Legislation
Since Lopez, the federal circuit courts have upheld several envi-
ronmental regulations that roused Commerce Clause questions, in-
cluding some arising under the ESA. 58 For example, National
Association of Home Builders v. Babbit (NAHB) 59 involved a constitu-
tional challenge to section 9(a)(1) of the ESA, which forbids
"takes" of the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly (the Fly). The United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld the
take provision as applied to the Fly on two grounds: (1) Fly takes
affected the channels of interstate commerce; and (2) Fly takes sub-
stantially affected interstate commerce because extinction of the
species would affect biodiversity, which in turn would affect com-
merce. 60 The NAHB dissent asserted takes of the Fly were analo-
57. See id. at 630-35 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing all evidence supporting
Congress' view that gender violence substantially affected interstate commerce and
concluding a new standard of review had been adopted). Congress found, after
four years of research, that gender motivated violence caused 5 to 10 billion dollars
in losses to various industries in 1993 alone. Id. at 635 (Souter, J., dissenting). The
dissent cites over two pages of documented evidence supporting the substantial
effect that gender motivated violence has on the national economy. Id. at 630-633
(Souter, J., dissenting). It seems therefore, that unless an activity is economic, the
Court will require a very convincing showing of an effect on interstate commerce.
Id. (Souter,J., dissenting). Importantly, however, Morrison did not reject the tenet
that a noneconomic activity essential to a larger economic regulatory scheme
could affect interstate commerce as discussed in Lopez. See id. at 611-13 (failing to
even mention Lopez' brief treatment of the economic regulatory scheme mecha-
nisms for establishing substantial effect on interstate commerce).
58. See United States v. Ho, 311 F.3d 589, 601-02 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that
regulation of intrastate asbestos removal under Clean Air Act (CAA) was permissi-
ble under Commerce Clause because intrastate asbestos removal was commercial
activity that had substantial effect on interstate commerce when aggregated); Gibbs
v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 492 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that regulating takes of red
wolves was permitted under Commerce Clause because red wolf takes had substan-
tial aggregate effect on interstate commerce); NAHB, 130 F.3d 1041, 1052 (D.C.
Cir. 1997) (holding that regulating takes of endangered species of fly found only
in California was permitted under commerce power because takes sufficiently af-
fected interstate commerce by preventing destruction of biodiversity and prevent-
ing destructive interstate competition).
59. See 130 F.3d at 1052 (holding that regulating takes of endangered fly
found only in California was permitted under commerce power because takes suffi-
ciently affected interstate commerce by preventing destruction of biodiversity and
preventing destructive interstate competition; holding that fly was involved in in-
terstate competition and the channels of commerce) (citing ESA, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1538(a)(1), 1532(19) (2000)).
60. See id. at 1046-49 (explaining how takes of Fly affected channels of com-
merce, thereby coming under Congress' authority to regulate). For the purposes
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gous to Lopez' possession of guns in school zones, arguing neither
were economic, nor were they a part of an economic regulatory
scheme. 61 The dissent also argued that "biodiversity" was too specu-
lative and established too attenuated a link between noneconomic
takes of the Fly and interstate commerce. 62
In addition to NAHB, the circuit courts have upheld other envi-
ronmental regulations pertaining to intrastate activity in Gibbs v.
Babbit63 and Unird States v. Ho.64 In Gibbs, the Fourth Circuit justi-
fied the ESA's prohibition of red wolf takes on private land because
congressional findings established that red wolf takes amounted to
economic activity, or were economic in nature. 65 Because red wolf
takes were economic, Gibbs easily fell within Congress' commerce
power.66 In Ho, the Fifth Circuit upheld section 7412(h) of the
Clean Air Act (CAA), which regulates, inter alia, procedures for lo-
cal asbestos removal. 67 The court reasoned asbestos removal was a
commercial activity because many for-profit businesses were created
of this Comment, the court's holding regarding the channels of commerce is not
of great importance, nor is any other case that deals mostly with the channels or
instrumentalities of commerce.
61. Id. at 1064 (SentelleJ., dissenting) (highlighting similarities between gun
possession and Fly takes in terms of attenuated relation to interstate commerce).
62. Id. (arguing against biodiversity as a link to commerce). Judge Sentelle
argued:
... because of some undetermined and indeed undeterminable possibil-
ity that the fly might produce something at some undefined and undeter-
mined future time which might have some undefined and
undeterminable medical value ... Congress can today regulate anything
which might advance the pace at which the endangered species becomes
extinct.
Id. (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
63. 214 F.3d 483, 492 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that regulating takes of red
wolves was authorized by Commerce Clause because red wolves takes had substan-
tial aggregate effect on interstate commerce).
64. 311 F.3d 589, 601-02 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that regulation of intrastate
asbestos removal was authorized by Commerce Clause because intrastate asbestos
removal was commercial activity that had substantial effect on interstate commerce
when aggregated).
65. See Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 488 (citations omitted) (recognizing that red wolves
could increase tourism in North Carolina by 39 to 183 million dollars per year and
recognizing also that red wolves are part of several interstate markets, e.g., pelt
sales and scientific research).
66. See id. at 492 (explaining that red wolf takes constituted economic activity
because they created large interstate tourism industry); see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at
560 (stating "where economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce, leg-
islation regulating that activity will be sustained."). Interestingly, by denying certio-
rani, the Supreme Court seems willing to give courts some leeway in determining
what activities are economic. See Gibbs v. Norton, 531 U.S. 1145 (2001) (denying
certiorari).
67. See Ho, 311 F.3d at 603-04 (upholding section 7412(h)).
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for that purpose. 68 The court also stated that the CAA's regulation
constituted a larger economic regulatory scheme that would be un-
dercut if section 7412(h)'s asbestos removal procedures did not
regulate defendant Ho's asbestos removal business.69
In considering these cases, it appears the circuit courts that
have addressed the Commerce Clause issue are still open to up-
holding environmental legislation based on the Commerce Clause,
notwithstanding Lopez and Morrison.70 Moreover, it appears they are
willing to use Lopez' second method of establishing that an activity
has a substantial effect on interstate commerce if it is essential to a
larger economic regulatory scheme.71
D. Dissent Within the Fifth Circuit: The Rejected "Interactive
Effect" Requirement
According to some of the Supreme Court's language in Lopez,
several circuit courts and numerous legal scholars, if an activity is
not economic, the activity can still be aggregated to find a substan-
tial effect on interstate commerce if it is an essential part of a larger,
economic regulatory scheme, such that the scheme would be un-
dercut if the activity were not regulated. 72 Yet, some courts and
scholars adamantly argue that limitations on this economic regula-
tory scheme mechanism are necessary to stay true to Lopez and Mor-
rison. Two Fifth Circuit dissents, appearing in United States v.
68. See id. (explaining how asbestos removal was economic activity).
69. See id. at 602 (arguing that CAA was economic regulatory scheme).
70. See supra notes 58-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases up-
holding environmental laws against Commerce Clause challenges.
71. See supra notes 58-70 for an explanation of how various circuits have ap-
plied some version of the economic regulatory scheme.
72. See, e.g., Vermeule, supra note 46, at 1332-33 (arguing that Lopez ratified
economic regulatory scheme mechanism). Professor Vermeule argued:
The best reading of the cases [Lopez and Morrison] suggests that the com-
prehensive-scheme principle, unlike the aggregation principle, may allow
Congress to regulate intrastate activities that are not themselves commer-
cial or economic, so long as the regulation is integral to the success of a
larger valid scheme of (interstate or commercial) regulation. The key
passage from Lopez, for example, suggests that the scheme taken as a
whole must regulate economic activity, while the ancillary regulation
need not itself do so, at least if the ancillary regulation "arises out of' or is
"connected to" commercial activity.
Id. (alterations added).
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Hickman73 and United States v. McFarland74 respectively, proposed
such a limitation. The dissenting judges argued that all aggregated
activities must similarly affect interstate commerce and similarly af-
fect a relevant regulatory scheme. 75 The judges called this the "in-
teractive effect" requirement. 76 If applied, this requirement would
place a significant burden on aggregating noneconomic activities
because a particular activity and the activities with which it is to be
aggregated would need to have a similar effect on interstate com-
merce.77 Although the requirement raises important issues, dis-
cussed infra, the GDF Realty I court merely mentioned it without
applying or analyzing it. 78
73. 179 F.3d 230, 233 (5th Cir. 1999) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (en
banc), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1203 (2000) (proposing interactive effect require-
ment).
74. 311 F.3d 376, 401 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 962
(2003) (Garwood, J., dissenting) (expounding on what Hickman called interactive
effect requirement).
75. See Hickman, 179 F.3d at 233 (Higgenbotham, J., dissenting) (arguing for
interactive effect requirement); see also McFarland, 311 F.3d at 401 (Garwood, J.,
dissenting) (arguing for additional requirements for aggregation of noneconomic,
intrastate activities). The relevant issue in Hickman was whether Congress ex-
ceeded its Commerce Clause authority in passing the Hobbs Act. Hickman, 179
F.3d at 231. The Hobbs Act "criminalizes efforts to obstruct, delay or affect com-
merce or the movement of any article in commerce by robbery or extortion." Id.
Defendants convicted under the Act challenged its constitutionality under the
Commerce Clause, claiming that individual acts of robbery were not economic and
did not substantially affect commerce. Id. The court found a substantial effect by
aggregating all robberies under the Hobbs Act, where the economic effect would
be substantial. Id.
In McFarland, the court again considered the Hobbs Act and an evenly divided
en banc court upheld the legitimacy of aggregating robberies to find a substantial
effect on commerce. See McFarland, 311 F.3d at 381-82. The dissent, again
adopted by half the en banc court, agreed with the dissent in Hickman and argued
there must be some limits on aggregation if an activity is not economic. Id. The
dissent essentially argued that if activities are to be aggregated, they must be simi-
lar in nature, and must affect both the scheme regulating them and interstate
commerce generally. Id. at 401. The dissent reasoned that without requiring some
similarity between activities to be aggregated, a litigant could aggregate a clearly
noneconomic activity with a totally unrelated economic activity and then argue the
first activity substantially affects interstate commerce. Id.
76. See Hickman, 179 F.3d at 233 (Higgenbotham, J., dissenting).
77. See id. (explaining that interactive effect requirement should apply to limit
aggregation).
78. See GDFRealty 1, 326 F.3d at 632 (citing prior dissenting Fifth Circuit opin-
ions); see infra notes 184-90 and accompanying text for a discussion on the impli-
cations of the interactive effect requirement.
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III. WHAT HAPPENED IN GDF REALTY I: FACTUAL BACKGROUND,
THE PARTIES' ARGUMENTS AND THE FIFTH CIRCUIT'S ANALYSIS
In GDF Realty I, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's
holding that the ESA's take provision as applied to Cave Species was
constitutional, but on different grounds. 79 This section first sets
forth the factual background of the case, then briefly presents the
litigants' arguments, and finally, it discusses the Fifth Circuit's anal-
ysis.80 In explaining the Fifth Circuit's analysis, this Comment ad-
dresses how the court established a deferential standard of review;
how the court set forth Congress' power under the Commerce
Clause; how the court reviewed the ESA and its legislative history;
and finally, how the court assessed the litigants' arguments. 81 In
assessing the arguments, the court never directly addressed GDF
Realty's argument, yet the entire opinion seems geared toward re-
futing GDF Realty's argument by establishing how the ESA's take
provision as applied to Cave Species is constitutional.8 2
A. Factual Background
In 1983, the Purcell brothers and GDF Realty Investments, Ltd.
(GDF) purchased property in Travis County, Texas. 83 GDF subse-
quently began commercially developing the property, installing
water and wastewater gravity lines, force mains and other utilities.84
In 1988, during development, the United States Fish and Wildlife
Service (FWS) promulgated a rule listing six subterranean species,
known as the "Cave Species," as endangered under section 4 of the
ESA.85 The Cave Species are known to exist only in underground
portions of two Texas counties, Travis and Williams, the location of
79. See GDF Realty I, 326 F.3d at 637, 640 (rejecting district court's reasoning,
but affirming holding).
80. See infra notes 81-148 and accompanying text for a discussion of the GDF
Realty I opinion.
81. See GDFRealty I, 326 F.3d at 630-40 (reviewing Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence and assessing litigants' arguments).
82. See id. (addressing FWS' arguments, but never directly addressing GDF's
argument). This Comment does not address the concurrence, which argued that
aggregating the Cave Species was unnecessary to establish a substantial effect on
commerce. Id. 326 F.3d at 641-44 (explaining ESA take provision was valid).
83. See id. 326 F.3d at 624 (stating facts of case).
84. See id. (stating facts of case).
85. See id. at 625 (citing ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1) (2000); codified at 50
C.F.R. pt. 17.11 (2003)) (explaining regulation). The six species are the Bee
Creek Harvestman, the Bone Creek Harvestman, the Tooth Cave Pseudoscorpion,
the Tooth Cave Spider, the Tooth Cave Ground Beetle and the Kretschmarr Cave
Mole Beetle. 50 C.F.R. pt. 17.11. The species are subterranean arachnids, some
having eyes, and ranging from 1.4 to 8 millimeters in length. GDFRealty I, 326 F.3d
at 625.
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GDF's property.8 6 The Cave Species are not involved in any com-
mercial market.8 7
In 1994, the FWS notified GDF that the proposed development
would probably constitute a take of the Cave Species.8" The ESA
defines "take" as to "harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound..."
members of any particular endangered species.8 9 GDF subsequent-
ly attempted to circumvent the Cave Species obstacle by applying
for several ESA section 10(a) incidental take permits to allow for
the planned development, which FWS denied. 90
In 1999, GDF filed suit in federal court, challenging the consti-
tutionality of the ESA take provisions as applied to the Cave Spe-
cies, alleging the take provision contravened the limits placed on
the Commerce Clause by Lopez and Morrison.91 For this action, the
litigants agreed there were no factual disputes and each filed cross-
motions for summary judgment.92 In 2001, the Unites States Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Texas granted summary judg-
ment to defendant FWS, upholding the ESA's take provision. 93
GDF appealed to the Fifth Circuit, which reviewed only whether
takes of the Cave Species adequately affected interstate commerce
to fall under Congress' Commerce Clause power. 94 The Fifth Cir-
cuit upheld the district court's opinion, but on a different line of
reasoning.95
86. See GDF Realty I, 326 F.3d at 625 (reviewing facts about Cave Species and
where they exist).
87. See id. (explaining non-commercial nature of Cave Species). In some
cases, the scientists visited Texas from other states and some members of the Cave
Species were transported out of state for research. Id. The Cave Species were
transported to museums in New York, California, Pennsylvania, Illinois and Ken-
tucky. Id. Fifteen scientists published at least fourteen scientific articles concern-
ing the Cave Species in several different publications. Id.
88. See id. (reviewing facts and claiming development would also take two mi-
gratory bird species).
89. ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2000) (protecting endangered species takes
and defining "take").
90. See id. (citing ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (2000)) (describing FWS' denial
of incidental take permits for GDF). It should be noted that the GDFRealty Icourt
admonished the FWS for dealing somewhat unfairly with GDF, who acted in good
faith both in taking extensive measures to avoid Cave Species takes and in ob-
taining incidental take permits. Id.
91. See id. (reviewing facts and procedural history); see supra notes 35-57 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Lopez and Morrison.
92. See GDFRealty I, 326 F.3d at 627 (reviewing procedural history).
93. See id. (citing GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 169 F. Supp. 2d 648 (W.D.
Tex. 2001) (reviewing procedural history).
94. See id. at 622 (reviewing lower court's opinion).
95. See id. (reversing district court's opinion but retaining verdict).
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B. GDF's Argument
GDF argued Congress lacked the constitutional authority to
regulate takes of the Cave Species because the Cave Species were
entirely unrelated to interstate commerce, and therefore did not
fall within the Commerce Clause's scope.96 Although GDF con-
ceded that aggregating all takes of endangered species would sub-
stantially affect interstate commerce, it argued under Morrison that
aggregating Cave Species was improper because Cave Species takes
were not economic and they were not an essential part of an eco-
nomic regulatory scheme (i.e., the ESA). 97 Finally, GDF argued
that when determining whether a regulated activity has a substan-
tial effect on commerce, one must look to the regulated activity it-
self, not the motivation for engaging in the regulated activity.98
C. FWS' Argument
First, FWS argued that Cave Species takes alone substantially
affected interstate commerce. 99 FWS alternatively argued that,
when aggregated with other takes of endangered species, Cave Spe-
cies takes would have the requisite substantial effect.100 Finally,
FWS argued the court should look to the GDF's motivation for en-
gaging in activity that constituted Cave Species takes. 10 1
96. See id. at 632 (stating GDF's argument).
97. See GDF Realty I, 326 F.3d at 632 (setting forth GDF's argument); see Morri-
son, 529 U.S. at 610, 613, 618 (requiring that activity must be economic in nature
to be aggregated).
98. See GDFRealty 1, 326 F.3d at 633 (explaining that GDF contends only regu-
lated activity itself is relevant in Commerce Clause analysis).
99. See id. (discussing FWS' arguments).
100. See id. (discussing FWS' arguments).
101. See id. (discussing FWS' arguments). The District Court for the Western
District of Texas agreed with FWS that, when determining whether an activity sub-
stantially affects interstate commerce, GDF's motivation for engaging in activity
resulting in Cave Species takes is relevant. Id. The district court found that GDF's
plans to build a shopping center, a residential subdivision and other things easily
qualified as economic and easily affected interstate commerce. Id. In doing so,
the court considered the motivation for engaging in the activity resulting in inci-
dental takes instead of considering the commerciality of the actual regulated activ-
ity - Cave Species takes. Id. The Fifth Circuit rejected this approach to the
substantial effects analysis, declaring that only the actual regulated activity is rele-
vant, not the economic motivation for engaging in the regulated activity. Id.
At least one scholar disagrees with the Fifth Circuit's reasoning, asserting that
the activity being regulated is that which actually results in the take, where if land
development results in a take, then it is the land development that ESA regulates.
See Mathews, supra note 6, at 951-54 (arguing that Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323
F.3d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 2003), had more rational approach in considering activity that
resulted in take, rather than endangered species actually being taken, in ascertain-
ing whether endangered species takes were economic).
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FWS argued Cave Species takes alone, pre-aggregation, had a
direct relationship with and substantial effect on interstate com-
merce.' 0 2 FWS asserted Cave Species takes affected commerce in
two ways.' 03 First, there was a substantial scientific interest in
them. 0 4 According to FWS, scientific interest in Cave Species gen-
erated sufficient interstate activity through travel, study and scien-
tific literature to affect interstate commerce. 10 5
Second, Cave Species could significantly benefit commerce in
the future by improving scientific understanding, leading to medi-
cal advances and ensuring biodiversity. 10 6 FWS maintained that
possible future commercial benefits derived from the Cave Species,
like developments in medicine, would be significant enough to sub-
stantially affect interstate commerce. 10 7 FWS referred primarily to
existing research indicating that certain endangered species were
used to treat diseases to support its argument.'08 Alternatively, FWS
argued Cave Species takes, when aggregated with all endangered
species takes, would have a sufficient impact on interstate com-
merce to satisfy the substantial effect requirement. 10 9 FWS offered
no argument supporting this contention, probably because GDF
stipulated to it."10
102. See GDF Realty , 326 F.3d at 637 (reviewing FWS' argument).
103. See id. (stating that activity can affect commerce in two ways).
104. See id. (stating that activity can affect commerce directly, without aggre-
gation).
105. See id. (reviewing FWS' argument). The court listed the ways scientific
interest in the Cave Species could affect interstate commerce: "[s]ome scientists
have studied the Cave Species. In doing so, some have traveled to Texas. In coor-
dination with this research, some Cave Species have been transported to and from
museums in five States. Finally, articles about the Cave Species have been pub-
lished in scientific journals." Id.
106. See id. (reviewing FWS' argument that species could have future benefits
affecting commerce).
107. See GDF Realty I, 326 F.3d at 637 (reviewing FWS' argument).
108. See id. at 637-38 (reviewing FWS' argument). In support of this argu-
ment, FWS asserted that:
Although little is yet understood about these particular species, scientists have
long observed that cave species ... often exhibit incredibly low metabolic
rates and possess extremely long life-spans ... [s]uch characteristics sug-
gest that further study of these species could lead to important develop-
ments in our understanding of longevity ....
Id. at 637-38 (emphasis added by Fifth Circuit; internal citations and quotations
omitted by Fifth Circuit).
109. Id. at 638 (discussing FWS' alternative argument).
110. See id. at 638-40 (neglecting to analyze whether takes of all endangered
species would substantially affect interstate commerce).
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D. Standard of Review
Before analyzing the case, the Fifth Circuit indicated it would
apply a rational basis standard of review to the issue of whether the
ESA's take provision could constitutionally apply to the Cave Spe-
cies."' By adding its own emphasis to Morrison's standard of review
language, the court stressed that the judiciary should show defer-
ence to any congressional findings that Congress offers in support
of its legislation, which reflects the traditional deference courts
show to congressional action.11 2 The court's approach suggests
a departure from the incidental heightened standard the Sup-
reme Court applied in Morrison.113 From this deferential platform,
the court analyzed Congress' commerce power, and subsequently,
whether regulating Cave Species takes fell within that power.11 4
E. The Fifth Circuit's Discussion of the Commerce Clause
Analysis
The Fifth Circuit closely followed Lopez and Morrison when re-
viewing Congress' commerce power."l 5 In doing so, the court first
emphasized Morrison's warning that almost any close Commerce
Clause analysis would engender legal uncertainty, most likely to
demonstrate that determining what activities affect commerce is
often a gray area.116 The court then repeated the two basic ways
111. Id. at 627 (discussing applicable standard of review).
112. GDF Realty I, 326 F.3d at 627. The court quoted the following language
from Morrison: "[d]ue respect for the decisions of a coordinate branch of Govern-
ment demands that we invalidate a congressional enactment only upon a plain
showing that Congress has exceeded its constitutional bounds." Id. (quoting Morri-
son, 529 U.S. at 598) (emphasis added by Fifth Circuit). As discussed above, there
is some inconsistency between a rational basis review and what the Morrison Court
actually used. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text for discussion on Mor-
rison's standard of review.
113. See GDF Realty I, 326 F.3d at 627 (adopting rational basis standard, not-
withstanding Morrison's heightened review of congressional findings); see supra
notes 54-57 and accompanying text (discussing standard of review).
114. See GDFRealtv I, 326 F.3d at 627 (employing rational basis review). The
court employed rational basis review by deferring to Congress' findings on bi-
odiversity and upholding the traditional presumption that Congress' laws are con-
stitutional. Id. at 638-40.
115. See id. at 628-31 (setting forth Lopez and Morrison Commerce Clause
principles).
116. Id. (quoting Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610). In Morrison, Justice Rehnquist
stated that "[a] dmittedly, a determination whether an intrastate activity is commer-
cial or non-commercial may in some cases result in legal uncertainty." Morrison,
529 U.S. at 610. The Fifth Circuit seems to use this language to strengthen its
argument that Cave Species, although not economic, can still be regulated under
the Commerce Clause. See GDF Realty 1, 326 F.3d at 628-30 (implying that legal
uncertainty of activity does not preclude regulation).
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that an activity can affect commerce: it either directly affects com-
merce, or it can be aggregated with other like activities to affect
commerce.
117
In analyzing what activities may be aggregated, the Fifth Circuit
applied the economic regulatory scheme mechanism and the ag-
gregation principle to reconcile Lopez' and Morrison's economic re-
quirement with the intuitively noneconomic activity of Cave Species
takes. 118 First, the court recognized Morrison's requirement that
only economic activities could be aggregated. 119 Then, the court
declared an activity could be "economic" if it bore an essential rela-
tion to an economic regulatory scheme such that the scheme would
be undercut if the activity were not regulated. 120 According to the
court, if an activity bears an essential relation to a regulatory scheme
directed at economic activity, it can be aggregated to find a substan-
tial effect on interstate commerce, despite that the activity is facially
noneconomic. 12'
F. The Fifth Circuit Relied on the ESA's Legislative History to
Bolster its Holding
Before commencing the substantive analysis, the Fifth Circuit
briefly explained the ESA and the purpose for which Congress en-
acted it.122 According to Congress, and recognized by the Fifth
Circuit, the accelerating extinction rate of species was alarming be-
117. See GDFRealty 1, 326 F.3d at 629 (introducing aggregation principle).
118. Id. at 638-40 (applying analyses to establish that Cave Species takes sub-
stantially affect interstate commerce).
119. See id. at 629 (recognizing economic requirement and recognizing rea-
son for economic requirement: to prevent carte blanche congressional power to
regulate). In recognizing the requirement, the court quoted Morrison's statement
that there was no categorical rule prohibiting aggregation and regulation of
noneconomic activities. Id. at 630 (quoting Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613).
120. Id. at 630 (asserting that economic regulatory scheme mechanism estab-
lished activity's "economic" nature).
121. Id. at 630-31 (discussing economic requirement and economic regula-
tory scheme mechanism). In sum, the court reviewed the method for showing how
noneconomic activities can affect interstate commerce under the Commerce
Clause in three different steps: (1) establishing that the activity has an essential
relation to an economic regulatory scheme; (2) aggregating the activity with simi-
lar activities; and (3) establishing that, in the aggregate, the original noneconomic
regulated activity substantially affects interstate commerce. Id.
122. See GDFRealty 1, 326 F.3d at 626 (discussing ESA). Section 9(a) (1) of the
ESA proscribes a "take" of a member of any species listed as endangered. Id. (cit-
ing ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B)). Congress enacted the ESA in 1973 to "halt
and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost." See id. at 632
(quoting Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 176 (1978)) (emphasis added
by Fifth Circuit) (discussing purpose for which ESA was enacted). The Fifth Cir-
cuit recognized that the ESA was a response to threats to fish, wildlife and plants
arising primarily from "pollution, destruction of habitat and the pressures of trade."
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cause, inter alia, "it is in the best interest of mankind to minimize
the losses of genetic variations."'123 The court recognized the ESA's
take provision was the means designed to achieve Congress' goal of
preventing the extinction of species. 124 The court then indicated
its task was to determine, taking into account Congress' findings,
whether the Commerce Clause authorized the ESA's take provision
as applied to the Cave Species. 125 That is, whether Cave Species
takes substantially affected interstate commerce. 126 In executing
this task, the court addressed both GDF's and FWS' arguments as to
whether Cave Species takes would substantially affect interstate
commerce.127
G. Fifth Circuit Rejects FWS' First Argument, But Permits
Aggregation
First, the Fifth Circuit disagreed that Cave Species takes alone
substantially affected interstate commerce, noting the minimal con-
tacts the species had with the outside world and the attenuated,
speculative nature of any possible future commercial value the Cave
Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 93-412, at 2 (1973)) (emphasis added by Fifth Circuit)
(discussing Congressional intent).
123. Id. at 632 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 93-412, at 5) (emphasis added by Fifth
Circuit) (discussing why preventing extinction of species is paramount). The
court further quoted Congress' example of why preserving species is a priority:
[t]hey are keys to puzzles which we cannot solve, and may provide an-
swers to questions which we have not yet learned to ask.
... [O]ne of the critical chemicals in regulation of ovulation in humans
was found in a common plant... [w]ho knows, or can say, what potential
cures for cancer or other scourges, present or future, lie locked up in the
strictures of plants which may yet be undiscovered [sic], much less
analyzed?
Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 93-412, at 5).
124. See id. at 625, 632-33 (discussing how take provision protects endangered
species pursuant to Congress' goal). The take provision is applied to any species
that the FWS lists as endangered and in need of special protection. Id. Pursuant
to the ESA's policy, the Cave Species were listed as endangered for three reasons:
first, they were threatened with "potential loss of habitat owing to ongoing devel-
opment of activities;" second, no state or federal laws were in place to protect them
or their habitat; and finally, "[the Cave Species] require the maximum possible
protection provided by [the ESA] because their extremely small, vulnerable, and
limited habitats are within an area that can be expected to experience continued
pressures from economic and population growth." Id. at 625 (quoting Endan-
gered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 53 Fed. Reg. 36,029, 36,031-32 (Sept.
16, 1988) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) (explaining why Cave Species were
placed on endangered species list).
125. Id. (setting forth relevant issues).
126. Id. (stating that court's purpose was to determine whether Congress con-
stitutionally regulated Cave Species takes).
127. See GDF Realty I, 326 F.3d at 633-40 (reviewing and evaluating
arguments).
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Species may have. 128 Nevertheless, the court held that aggregating
Cave Species takes with all endangered species takes was proper in
this instance and, in the aggregate, endangered species takes would
substantially affect interstate commerce. 129
The court allowed aggregation, declaring Cave Species takes
bear an "essential relation" to the ESA, an economic regulatory
scheme, because the ESA's central purpose is to protect endan-
gered species and the ecosystems upon which they depend.1 30 The
court explained that permitting Cave Species takes would fail to
protect some endangered species and would negatively impact our
ecosystems, thereby undercutting the ESA's purpose to protect en-
dangered species.131 In addition, the court explained that Con-
gress intended that the ESA protect biodiversity because reductions
in biodiversity would substantially affect interstate commerce. 132 As
such, if Congress permitted Cave Species takes, biodiversity would
be reduced, thereby further undercutting the ESA.133 Finally, the
court adopted FWS' argument that "[a] llowing a particular take to
escape regulation because, viewed alone, it does not substantially
affect interstate commerce, would undercut the ESA's scheme and
lead to piecemeal extinctions."1 34
In addition to establishing that the Cave Species must be essen-
tial to a regulatory scheme for aggregation, the court placed great
emphasis on the notion that the regulatory scheme itself must be
directed at economic activity.1 35 According to the court, the ESA is
128. Id. at 637-38 (denying that Cave Species takes alone substantially affect
interstate commerce). Specifically, the court reasoned that the possible future
value of the Cave Species as a means to cure disease, or have some other commer-
cial effect, was far too attenuated and speculative to pass the Lopez and Morrison
economic requirement. See id.
129. See id. at 638-41 (holding that aggregation was proper to find substantial
effect on interstate commerce). The court stated that "[t]here is no market for
them; any future market is conjecture. If the speculative future medicinal benefits
from the Cave Species makes their regulation commercial, then almost anything
would be." Id. at 638.
130. Id. at 640 (citing H.R. REP. No. 93-412 (1973)) (explaining how failure
to regulate endangered species takes would undercut purpose of ESA).
131. Id. (explaining ESA's purpose, setting forth FWS' argument and then
concluding that Cave Species takes are essential to ESA).
132. See GDF Realty I, 326 F.3d at 640 (explaining ESA's purpose and why Cave
Species are essential to it).
133. Id. (explaining that Cave Species are essential to ESA).
134. See id. at 640 (quoting FWS' argument). FWS further argued that takes
of any species threatened the "interdependent web" of all species in derogation of
Congress' finding that the interrelationships of plants and animals between them-
selves and their environment is critical. See id.
135. See id. 638-40 (asserting that larger regulatory scheme must be directed
at economic activity).
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directed at economic activity because endangered species are of "es-
thetic, ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and scien-
tific value ... ,"136 The court also relied on the ESA's legislative
history, which recognized the "incalculable" value of the genetic
heritage that might be lost absent regulation. 137 Based on these
congressional findings, the court concluded the ESA was an eco-
nomic regulatory scheme for the purpose of aggregating Cave Spe-
cies takes with takes of all endangered species. 13 8 The Fifth Circuit
affirmed the district court's holding, asserting that the ESA section
9 (a) (1) prohibition on endangered species takes was constitutional
as applied to the Cave Species.13 9 Judge Dennis concurred, but ar-
gued aggregation was unnecessary and that Congress could regu-
late based on the Cave Species' relation to the ESA. 140
136. Id. at 639 (quoting ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (a) (3)) (establishing that ESA
is directed at activity economic in nature).
137. See GDF Realty I, 326 F.3d at 639 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 93-412, at 4).
The court also quoted a Senate Report as a precursor to ESA, which also empha-
sized the importance of biodiversity with regard to interstate commerce:
[B]usinessmen may profit from the trading and marketing of that species
for an indefinite number of years, where otherwise it would have been
completely eliminated from commercial channels in a very brief span of
time. Potentially more important, however, is the fact that with each species
we eliminate, we reduce the [genetic] pool.., available for use by man in
future years. Since each living species and subspecies has developed in a
unique way to adapt itself to the difficulty of living in the world's environ-
ment, as a species is lost, its distinctive gene material ... is also irretriev-
ably lost.
Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 91-526, at 1415 (1969) (emphasis added by Fifth Circuit;
alteration by Fifth Circuit).
138. See id. at 639-41 (finding that ESA is economic in nature, as required if
noneconomic intrastate activities are to be permissibly aggregated).
139. See id. (setting forth court's holding).
140. See id. at 643-44 (DennisJ., concurring) (explaining how intrastate activ-
ity can validly be regulated despite de minimis effect on commerce). Judge Dennis
stated:
The prohibition of Cave Species takes is integral to achieving Congress's
[sic] rational purpose in enacting the ESA. In particular, the ESA regu-
lates interstate commerce by attempting to prevent the extinction of both
commercial and non-commercial species. Regulations under the ESA
therefore significantly affect the nation's economy and welfare. Non-
commercial species are in many instances vital to the survival of ecosys-
tems upon which commercial species are dependant . . .The ESA is a
necessary and proper means not only to conserve the nations valuable
biological resources, but also to promote interstate commerce involving
those resources.
Id.
Judge Dennis believes, therefore, that an essential relation to an economic
regulatory scheme such that the scheme would be undercut without an activity's
regulation is a sufficient condition to render regulating noneconomic intrastate
activity constitutional. See id.
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H. Denial of En Banc Rehearing: Dissent
On February 27, 2004, the Fifth Circuit denied GDF's petition
for a rehearing en banc. 141 Judge Jones, joined by four other
judges, filed a dissenting opinion to the denial. 142 The dissent con-
tested the following three points, asserting that under Lopez and
Morrison, Cave Species clearly did not fall within the ambit of the
Commerce Cause. 143 First, the dissent rejected the notion that the
ESA was directed at economic activity.144 The dissent criticized the
court's reliance on future effects endangered species and biodivers-
ity might have on commerce, pointing out that the court had previ-
ously rejected this reason as speculative when it concluded Cave
Species alone were not economic.1 45 Second, the dissent argued
that the Cave Species were not essential to the ESA because the ESA
would continue to function if Cave Species takes were permitted.1 46
Finally, the dissent emphatically argued that the Commerce Clause
only authorizes Congress to regulate commerce, not ecosystems,
sexual inequity or violent crime.1 47 The dissent argued that if Con-
gress could regulate intrastate Cave Species takes by aggregating
them through the economic regulatory scheme mechanism, Con-
gress could regulate anything, resulting in a carte blanche federal
police power. 148
IV. DOES THE FIFTH CIRCUIT'S USE OF THE ECONOMIC
REGULATORY SCHEME MECHANISM WORK?
Although the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in GDF Realty I may be
controversial, the court nevertheless properly concluded that the
ESA's take provision is constitutional under Lopez and Morrison.149
141. See GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 362 F.3d 286, 287-93 (5th Cir. 2004)
[hereinafter GDFRealty I1] (en banc) (per curiam) (denying petition for rehearing
en banc).
142. See id. at 287-88 (Jones, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with majority's denial
for rehearing and dissenting to majority's opinion in GDFRealty , 326 F.3d at 630-
40).
143. See id. at 291 (rejecting that ESA was an "economic" statute and relying
on Supreme Court's Lopez and Morrison opinions).
144. See id. (rejecting that ESA was an "economic" statute).
145. See id. (alleging inconsistency in court's reasoning).
146. See GDF Realty II, 362 F.3d at 291-93 (rejecting that Cave Species takes
were essential to ESA).
147. See id. (arguing that Commerce Clause did not permit regulating Cave
Species takes).
148. See id. (arguing that allowing ESA to regulate Cave Species results in fed-
eral police power).
149. See infra notes 150-210 and accompanying text for a discussion on why
the Fifth Circuit's holding is proper. Again, it is worth noting that GDF did not
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According to Lopez' interpretation of the Commerce Clause, a
noneconomic activity, like Cave Species takes, may be aggregated
with other similar activities to produce a substantial effect on inter-
state commerce if it is an essential part of an economic regulatory
scheme. 150 Because GDF conceded that all endangered species
takes in the aggregate would have a substantial effect on commerce,
the court did not directly address that issue.'51 Rather, the court
focused on whether the economic regulatory scheme mechanism
would permit aggregation of the noneconomic Cave Species, de-
spite the Morrison economic requirement. 152 The following section
examines the Fifth Circuit's use of the economic regulatory scheme
mechanism to aggregate noneconomic Cave Species takes with all
other endangered species takes and concludes that the Fifth Cir-
cuit's decision is permissible under current Commerce Clause
jurisprudence. 153
A. Aggregation Part I: The ESA as an Economic Regulatory
Scheme
The Fifth Circuit's conclusion that the ESA is an economic reg-
ulatory scheme rests in part on grounds the court previously re-
jected as speculative, though in a slightly different context.1 54
Again, for the Fifth Circuit to aggregate noneconomic activity by
using the economic regulatory scheme mechanism, it must first es-
tablish that the ESA is directed at economic activity. 155 To establish
this, the court explained that: (1) the ESA is aimed at protecting
facially challenge the constitutionality of the ESA as a whole, but rather the ESA's
take provision as applied to the Cave Species. GDF Realty I, 326 F.3d at 624. As
such, the Fifth Circuit had to determine only whether the Commerce Clause per-
mits regulating Cave Species takes. Id.
150. See Vermeule, supra note 46, at 1332-33 (arguing best reading of Lopez is
that it ratified use of economic regulatory scheme mechanism to regulate
noneconomic activity when activity can be appropriately connected to economic
activity via economic regulatory scheme).
151. GDF Realty 1, 326 F.3d at 638-43 (noting GDF conceded that all endan-
gered species takes in aggregate would substantially affect interstate commerce
and offering support for proposition that endangered species takes in the aggre-
gate would substantially affect interstate commerce).
152. See id. at 638-41 (focusing on economic regulatory scheme mechanism).
153. See infra notes 154-210 and accompanying text for a discussion on how
the Fifth Circuit applied the economic regulatory scheme and why its use of the
scheme was proper.
154. See GDF Realty II, 362 F.3d 286, 291-93 (5th Cir. 2004) (Jones, J.
dissenting).
155. See GDFRealty I, 326 F.3d at 639 (stating that ESA is economic if directed
at economic activity) (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 548, 561 (1995); United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610 (2000)).
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biodiversity, which it accomplishes by prohibiting endangered spe-
cies takes; (2) flourishing biodiversity could have substantial future
effects on commerce, i.e., species could contribute to medicines
and other assets important to commerce; therefore, (3) because the
ESA protects biodiversity, it is directed at economic activity. 156 Yet,
when FWS asserted almost identical grounds to establish that Cave
Species takes were "economic" in nature, the court rejected FWS'
argument, stating that the "possibility of future substantial effects of
the Cave Species on interstate commerce, through industries such
as medicine, is simply too hypothetical and attenuated from the
regulation in question to pass constitutional muster. ' 157 The court
is thus inconsistent as to whether reductions in biodiversity and the
future effects that species might have sufficiently affect interstate
commerce to come under the purview of the Commerce Clause.'58
Nevertheless, this inconsistency is not fatal. 159 When the court
rejected FWS' future effects argument, it did so on the ground that
any future effects the Cave Species alone, pre-aggregation, might
have on commerce were too miniscule to substantially affect inter-
state commerce. 160 Whereas, the possible future effects of Cave
Species takes, when aggregated with all endangered species takes,
seem far more likely to substantially affect interstate commerce
than the future effects of Cave Species takes alone.16' Based on this
distinction, the court was not overly inconsistent in characterizing
Cave Species takes as noneconomic, holding that the ESA as a
whole is a regulatory scheme directed at economic activity because
all endangered species takes in the aggregate would constitute eco-
nomic activity. 162 Therefore, the court's conclusion that the ESA is
156. See id. at 638-40 (citing Congressional reports, which state biodiversity
and "incalculable value" of species affects commerce).
157. See id. at 637-38 (concluding that Cave Species takes alone are not eco-
nomic and citing Morrison's attenuation principle to negate FWS' argument). The
court also rejected FWS' argument that Cave Species were economic because of
scientific interest in them, holding that any commercial activity ensuing from the
interest was nominal. Id. at 636.
158. See infra note 162 and accompanying text.
159. See infra notes 160-68 and accompanying text for a discussion on why
the inconsistency does not destroy the validity of the court's holding.
160. GDF Realty 1, 326 F.3d at 637 (holding that any effect Cave Species had
on commerce was attenuated and nominal).
161. Cf Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 492 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that regu-
lating takes of red wolves was authorized by Commerce Clause because red wolf
takes had substantial aggregate effect on interstate commerce). If red wolf takes in
the aggregate substantially affect interstate commerce, then all takes of any endan-
gered species in the aggregate must affect interstate commerce. Id.
162. Compare GDFRealty 1, 326 F.3d at 637 (holding that Cave Species are not
economic), with id. at 639 (declaring that reduction in biodiversity in general, i.e.,
25
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economic, based on future effects and biodiversity grounds, is de-
fensible, especially considering that Congress and other courts have
agreed with the Fifth Circuit. 163
An interesting alternative argument the court might have em-
ployed is that the ESA directly regulates at least some economic
activity. 164 For example, it regulates the red wolf takes considered
in Gibbs and, as Judge Jones mentioned in her dissent, the ESA reg-
ulates other commercially related activities like hunting, tourism
and scientific research and, indirectly, commercial development. 165
Based on this, the court might have argued that the ESA is eco-
nomic because it is clearly directed at economic activity, regardless
of whether it is incidentally directed at some noneconomic activ-
ity. 1 6 6 As such, all the noneconomic activities the ESA regulates
unchecked extinction of species, would substantially affect interstate commerce,
and, therefore, would be "economic"). Also, it is important to remember that GDF
conceded that all endangered species takes in the aggregate would substantially
affect interstate commerce and therefore fall under the Commerce Clause. Id.
As an aside, there is a logical quirk with this argument. That is, it may seem
circular to argue that the ESA is economic based on the fact that it prevents all
endangered species takes in the aggregate, when the purpose of establishing that
the ESA is economic is to aggregate Cave Species takes with all endangered species
takes to find a substantial affect on commerce. This quirk, however, is not detri-
mental to the argument. The premise is that all endangered species takes in the
aggregate constitute economic activity insofar as they'would substantially affect in-
terstate commerce. This premise was conceded by GDF and there is substantial
evidence supporting it. See supra notes 1 and 2. If the premise that all endan-
gered species takes in the aggregate would constitute economic activity in that they
would affect interstate commerce is true, then the ESA must be directed at eco-
nomic activity because the ESA is a regulatory scheme designed to prevent all en-
dangered species takes. Ultimately, what FWS was trying to prove is that Cave
Species takes can validly be aggregated with all other endangered species takes,
which is distinct from trying to prove that all endangered species takes in the ag-
gregate affect commerce. Therefore, predicating the ESA's economic nature on
the fact that it is directed at preventing all endangered species takes in the aggre-
gate is not circular.
163. See GDF Realty 1, 326 F.3d at 626, 632, 640 (explaining Congressional
findings behind ESA supporting that biodiversity reductions affect interstate com-
merce); supra notes 1-2, 107-11, 122-23, 126, 128 and accompanying text for a dis-
cussion on biodiversity; NAHB, 130 F.3d 1041, 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (stating that
"elimination of... some ... endangered species would have a staggering effect on
biodiversity... and, thereby, on the current and future interstate commerce that
relies on the availability of a diverse array of species .... In the most narrow view
of economic value, endangered plants and animals are valuable as sources of
medicine and genes .... ").
164. GDF Realty II, 362 F.3d 286, 291 (5th Cir. 2004) (conceding that ESA
could regulate commercially related activity, including hunting, tourism and scien-
tific research).
165. See Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 488 (holding red wolf takes were economic in na-
ture and proper subject of Congressional regulation); GDF Realty II, 362 F.3d at
291-93 (Jones, J. dissenting).
166. See supra note 165 (illustrating that ESA is directed at economic activity,
though not exclusively). Indeed, the whole purpose of the economic regulatory
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could be brought under the Commerce Clause's scope on the
ground that they are essential to the ESA such that the ESA would
be undercut but for their regulation. 167 This approach might have
avoided the court's reliance on biodiversity to show that the ESA is
directed at economic activity, thereby avoiding the controversy
brought on by the dissent.1 68
B. Aggregation Part II: Cave Species Takes are Essential to the
ESA
The Fifth Circuit was correct in concluding that the ESA's take
provision as applied to Cave Species is essential to the ESA.
169
Judge Dennis articulated the court's argument well in asserting that
Congress passed the ESA to protect all endangered or threatened
species and their ecosystems from extinction or harm. 170 If some
endangered species are not protected only because they are
noneconomic, the purpose and efficacy of the ESA will be "under-
cut" because the ESA can no longer regulate precisely what Con-
gress intended it to regulate.17' Analogously, in Wickard, the
Supreme Court found that failure to regulate intrastate wheat pro-
duction undercut the purpose of the AAA because it would upset
the interstate wheat market, where the AAA was supposed to regu-
late all activity within the scope of that interstate market.172 Simi-
larly, regulating Cave Species takes is essential to the ESA because
its essential purpose and mandate to protect endangered species
scheme seems to be to permit aggregation in precisely these circumstances, e.g.,
when a statute regulates an activity, but that "activity" in some instances does not
happen to be "economic."
167. See infra notes 169-76 and accompanying text for a discussion on why
the court's conclusion that Cave Species takes are essential to ESA is reasonable.
168. See GDFRealty I, 326 F.3d at 639 (relying on biodiversity to establish how
ESA is directed at economic activity).
169. See infra notes 170-76 and accompanying text for a discussion on why
the court properly concluded that regulating Cave Species takes are essential to
the ESA.
170. See GDF Realty I, 326 F.3d at 644 (Dennis, J., concurring) (explaining
purpose of ESA).
171. See id. at 640 (Dennis, J., concurring) (explaining how Cave Species takes
are essential to ESA); see also Babbit v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great
Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 699 (1995) (5-4 decision) (stating that clear purpose of ESA
was to protect endangered species from extinction at all costs). It is important to
understand that what is required here is only to establish that Cave Species takes
are essential to the ESA, not that the Cave Species takes independently affect inter-
state commerce.
172. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 115-16, 127-29 (explaining AAA and aggregation
principle); supra notes 29-34 for a discussion of Wickard.
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would not be effectuated if it were not applied to any particular
endangered species.' 7 3
The foregoing points illustrate that for a regulated activity to
be "essential" to a regulatory scheme, it is not necessary that the
regulatory scheme completely disintegrate if a particular activity is
not regulated; nowhere is such a thing required. 174 If it were neces-
sary, we would be left with the absurd conclusion that, assuming the
absence of certain relevant factors, executing a statute in accor-
dance with the statute's provisions is not essential to the statute. 175
Consequently, it is not difficult to see why the Fifth Circuit con-
cluded that the ESA's take provision as applied to any single endan-
gered species, i.e., the Cave Species, is an essential part of the
ESA. 176
C. Aggregation Part III: The Interactive Effect Requirement
and Policy Choices
As previously argued, the Fifth Circuit implicitly declined to
adopt the interactive effect requirement posited by the Hickman
and McFarland dissents by simply not addressing it in its analysis of
the case. 177 It is unclear why the GDF Realty Imajority would bring
it up without addressing it, but the rejected requirement flushes out
an important underlying issue regarding the aggregation of Cave
Species. 178 Again, the interactive effect requirement stated that if
activities are to be aggregated, they must all have a similar kind of
effect on both the scheme regulating them and on interstate com-
merce. 179 The GDFRealty Imajority adequately demonstrated that
any given endangered species take has a similar effect on the ESA as
173. See ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (stating that purpose of ESA is to protect spe-
cies susceptible to extinction); id. § 1533(a-b) (setting forth provisions for "critical
habitat designations" designed to protect habitats of endangered species). Con-
gress enacted the ESA in 1973 to "halt and reverse the trend toward species extinc-
tion, whatever the cost." See GDF Realty I, 326 F.3d at 632 (quoting Tenn. Valley Auth.
v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 176 (1978)) (emphasis added by Fifth Circuit).
174. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 548 (1995) (failing to impose require-
ment that regulatory must be destroyed for activity to be essential to it).
175. Cf supra note 173 (setting forth purpose of ESA: to generally prevent
takes of any endangered species).
176. See id. (noting that ESA is clearly designed to protect endangered spe-
cies).
177. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text for a discussion on the
Fifth Circuit's implicit rejection of the interactive effect requirement.
178. See infra notes 191-202 for a discussion of the federalism issues that the
economic regulatory scheme causes, but the interactive effect requirement would
not cause.
179. See GDF Realty I, 326 F.3d at 631-32 (citing United States v. McFarland, 311
F.3d 376, 401 (5th Cir. 2002) (Garwood, J., dissenting)) (explaining interactive
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any other endangered species take, so this aspect of the require-
ment is inconsequential.18 0
The problem is whether Cave Species and other endangered
species have a similar effect on interstate commerce.18 1 For exam-
ple, economic red wolf takes, which cause significant pecuniary re-
ductions in North Carolina's interstate tourist industry, likely affect
interstate commerce far differently than takes of six non-commer-
cial subterranean arachnids. 182 If Cave Species can only be aggre-
gated with other species that have a similar nominal impact on a
commercial market, it may be difficult to show how Cave Species
takes, when aggregated with other commercially insignificant species,
substantially affect interstate commerce.18 3
Although the interactive effect requirement is not controlling
law, as it appears only in two dissenting opinions to which the Su-
preme Court subsequently denied certiorari, the Fifth Circuit's re-
fusal to apply it points out the clandestine policy choice being
made. 8 4 The interactive effect requirement directly conflicts with
the economic regulatory scheme mechanism because the former
would prohibit aggregating noneconomic Cave Species takes with
any economic takes, whereas the latter circumvents this quandary by
permitting aggregation if an activity is essential to an economic reg-
ulatory scheme.' 8 5 That is, the economic regulatory scheme mech-
anism does not care whether economic and noneconomic activities
effect requirement); see supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text for a discussion
on the rejected interactive effect requirement.
180. See supra notes 169-76 and accompanying text for a discussion on why all
endangered species takes equally affect or undercut the ESA.
181. See infra notes 182-83 and accompanying text for an explanation of how
the interactive effect requirement is problematic.
182. See Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 493-94 (4th Cir. 2000) (explaining ex-
tent to which red wolf takes affected interstate commerce).
183. Cf United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 548, 558-60, 567 (1995) (implying that
aggregating many instances of noneconomic activity will not render that activity
economic or create substantial effect on commerce; there must be some initial
nexus between activity and interstate commerce).
184. United States v. Hickman, 179 F.3d 230, 233 (5th Cir. 1999) (Higginbot-
ham, J., dissenting) (en banc), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1203 (2000) (proposing inter-
active effect requirement); McFarland, 311 F.3d 376, 401 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc),
cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 1749 (Garwood, J., dissenting) (expounding on what Hick-
man called interactive effect requirement).
185. See supra notes 74-78 and 128-40 and accompanying text for discussions
on the interactive effect requirement and the Fifth Circuit's use of the economic
regulatory scheme to aggregate Cave Species takes with all other takes of endan-
gered species. The interactive effect requirement only permits aggregation of ac-
tivities that have a similar effect on interstate commerce or commercial market. Id.
If this requirement were to apply, noneconomic Cave Species takes would have a
different effect on the ESA than would economic takes insofar as one take affects a
commercial market and one does not. 1d.
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will be aggregated; rather, it only requires that all aggregated activi-
ties be essential to the relevant economic regulatory scheme. 186
Between these two alternative tests, the court chose the eco-
nomic regulatory scheme mechanism, broadening the scope of the
Commerce Clause and allowing the ESA to fulfill its purpose, which
is to protect endangered species and their habitats. 187 If the inter-
active effect requirement were to apply, the ESA would only protect
some species nearing extinction and not others.18 8 Such a bizarre
result, which would protect commercially viable endangered spe-
cies but not other species nearing extinction, eviscerates the ESA's
science and policy goals. 189 Therefore, it is no small wonder that
the Fifth Circuit rejected the method of interpreting the Com-
merce Clause's scope that unnecessarily leads to environmentally
undesirable results.190
D. The Dissent's Carte Blanche Police Power Allegation
It is important to address the dissent's contention that the Fifth
Circuit's use of the economic regulatory scheme mechanism cre-
ated a carte blanche federal police power. 191 This allegation cuts to
the heart of federalism and the issue of how expansive, normatively,
the Commerce Clause should be: how far can Congress go without
abrogating state sovereignty under the Tenth Amendment?1 92
186. See supra note 46 (setting forth requirements of economic regulatory
scheme); supra notes 130-39 and accompanying text (setting forth Fifth Circuit's
application of economic regulatory scheme).
187. See GDF Realty I, 326 F.3d at 638-41 (applying economic regulatory
scheme); ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (stating that purpose of ESA is to protect species
susceptible to extinction); id. § 1533(a-b) (setting forth provisions for "critical
habitat designations" designed to protect habitats of endangered species). Con-
gress enacted the ESA in 1973 to "halt and reverse the trend toward species extinc-
tion, whatever the cost." See GDF Realty I, 326 F.3d at 632 (quoting Tenn. Valley Auth.
v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 176 (1978)) (emphasis added by Fifth Circuit).
188. See supra notes 74-78, 185 and accompanying text for a discussion on
how the interactive effect requirement limits the aggregation principle based on a
relationship between the regulated activity and interstate commerce.
189. See id. (discussing Congress' purpose in enacting ESA); see supra notes 2,
106-11 and accompanying text for a discussion of Congress' science and policy
goals in enacting ESA.
190. See GDF Realty I, 326 F.3d at 622-44 (implicitly rejecting interactive effect
requirement by declining to address it in its analysis).
191. See GDFRealty II, 362 F.3d 286, 289-93 (5th Cir. 2004) (arguing that al-
lowing ESA to regulate Cave Species takes results in federal police power).
192. See U.S. CONsT. amend. X (reserving those powers not enumerated in
Constitution for people; establishing dual sovereignty).
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Despite the grandiosity of the dissent's allegation, it lacks
force. 193
The dissent's primary concern was that Congress could regu-
late any purely intrastate, noneconomic activity by aggregating it
with tenuously related economic activities and throwing the heap of
them into one omnibus statute. 194 If this were the case, Congress
could easily establish that all activities that statutes regulate, in the
aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce. 195 The prob-
lem with this contention is that the economic regulatory scheme
mechanism presupposes a cohesive regulatory scheme, not a hodge-
podge of regulations thrown under one bill. 196 Moreover, if an ac-
tivity is not essential to the scheme of regulation, then the eco-
nomic regulatory scheme mechanism will fail. 197 Therefore, under
the economic regulatory scheme mechanism, Congress cannot reg-
ulate any intrastate activity it wishes; it must first show that the activ-
ity is essential to a comprehensive, economic regulatory scheme
such that the scheme would be undercut but for that activity's
regulation. 198
In the case of the ESA, there is one unified purpose: to protect
endangered species living in the United States, and the habitats and
ecosystems on which they depend.1 99 The ESA has several provi-
sions that constitute a comprehensive scheme to effectuate that sin-
193. See infra notes 194-201 and accompanying text for a discussion on why
the economic regulatory scheme does not grant Congress a carte blanche federal
police power.
194. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (discussing danger of de facto federal police
power).
195. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 548, 564 (2000) (stating that too much
aggregation results in carte blanche federal police power because Congress could
regulate anything); supra note 39.
196. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text for a discussion on how an
activity must be essential to an economic regulatory scheme. Professor Vermeule
argued that "[t]he best reading of the cases [Lopez and Morrison] suggests that the
comprehensive-scheme principle, unlike the aggregation principle, may allow
Congress to regulate intrastate activities that are not themselves commercial or
economic, so long as the regulation is integral to the success of a larger valid
scheme of (interstate or commercial) regulation." (Alterations added).
197. See GDF Realty I, 326 F.3d at 643 (Dennis, J., concurring) (explaining
how economic regulatory scheme mechanism can be used to aggregate
noneconomic activities); supra notes 115-25 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion on the Fifth Circuit's application of the economic regulatory scheme
mechanism.
198. See GDFRealty I, 326 F.3d at 643 (Dennis,J., concurring) (explaining that
economic regulatory scheme mechanism requires activity to be "essential" to regu-
latory scheme).
199. See, e.g., Babbit v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S.
687, 699 (1995) (stating that clear purpose of ESA was to protect endangered spe-
cies from extinction at all costs).
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gle purpose.200 Therefore, only those intrastate, noneconomic
activities that are essential to that scheme can be aggregated with
similar economic activities, i.e., other endangered species takes, to
establish a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 20 1 This clarifi-
cation demonstrates that the dissent's concern is somewhat over-
blown, as it is simply not the case that any activity can be aggregated
with any other activity whatsoever to find a substantial on
commerce.
202
E. The Fifth Circuit's Conclusion is Consistent with Precedent
The most interesting thing about GDF Realty I is that it is the
first appellate level case to explicitly employ the economic regula-
tory scheme mechanism, and only that mechanism, to establish that
an entirely intrastate, noneconomic activity like Cave Species takes
falls within Congress' Commerce Clause authority. 20 3 I argue that
the Fifth Circuit's use of the economic regulatory scheme mecha-
nism is a valid method of aggregating noneconomic, intrastate ac-
tivity to establish a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 20 4 As
posited earlier, Lopez created the mechanism when it analyzed
whether the Gun Free School Zones Act had a substantial effect on
interstate commerce. 205 Moreover, Morrison did not reject that part
of Lopez' analysis. 20 6 In fact, the Morrison majority did not even ad-
dress it, probably because the majority did not consider the Vio-
lence Against Women Act to be a comprehensive economic
200. See 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq. (setting forth ESA's statutory scheme).
201. See GDFRealty I, 326 F.3d at 643 (Dennis,J., concurring) (explaining how
economic regulatory scheme mechanism can be used to aggregate noneconomic
activities); supra notes 115-25 and accompanying text for a discussion on the Fifth
Circuit's application of the economic regulatory scheme mechanism.
202. See supra notes 191-201 and accompanying text for a discussion on why
the dissent's opinion is overblown.
203. Compare GDFRealty I, 326 F.3d at 622, with NAHB, 130 F.3d 1041, 1046-49
(D.C. Cir. 1997): United States v. Ho, 311 F.3d 589, 601-02 (5th Cir. 2002); Gibbs v.
Babbit, 214 F.3d 483, 492 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Hickman, 179 F.3d 230, 233
(5th Cir. 1999); United States v. McFarland, 311 F.3d 376, 401 (5th Cir. 2002).
204. See supra notes 150-214 and accompanying text for a discussion support-
ing the Fifth Circuit's opinion.
205. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (asserting that gun possession could not be
regulated on ground that it was "not an essential part of a larger regulation of
economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the
intrastate activity were regulated.").
206. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 598-619 (failing to reject use of economic regula-
tory scheme to permit aggregation to find substantial effect on commerce and
declaring that court will not adopt categorical rule against aggregating non-
economic activity).
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regulatory scheme in the first place. 20 7 Furthermore, many of the
circuit courts have recognized the legitimacy of the economic regu-
latory scheme mechanism by addressing or using it in their opin-
ions. 20 8 Even academics have interpreted Lopez and Morrison as
allowing aggregation of noneconomic activity when that activity is
essential to an economic regulatory scheme. 20 9 Therefore, it seems
sound to conclude that the economic regulatory scheme mecha-
nism is a legitimate analytical tool courts may use to uphold federal
regulation that may at times inadvertently apply to certain intra-
state, noneconomic activities. 210
V. WHAT DOES THE GDF REALTY I OPINION MEAN FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE?
GDFRealty I's holding, along with a slew of other circuit court
case holdings, seems to suggest that the circuit courts do not inter-
pret Lopez and Morrison as the death knell for federal regulation
inadvertently targeting intrastate, noneconomic activities. 211 Never-
theless, the issue remains extremely controversial, evident in the
dissents of GDFRealty II, NAHB and Gibbs.2 12 The dissenting justices
contend that the Commerce Clause simply does not authorize regu-
lating violence, ecosystems or any other activity not intuitively com-
mercial. 213 Yet, the Supreme Court itself denied certiorari to Gibbs,
NAHB, Hickman, McFarland, and recently, GDF Realty II all of which
employed the economic regulatory scheme.214 Given the Supreme
207. See id. at 598-627 (failing to address economic regulatory scheme mecha-
nism introduced by Lopez when declaring Violence Against Women Act is unconsti-
tutional). The Act allowed recovery of punitive damages for violent acts against
women. See id.
208. See supra note 203.
209. Vermeule, supra note 46, at 1332 (stating that best reading of Lopez and
Morrison is that they allow use of economic regulatory scheme mechanism to aggre-
gate noneconomic activity).
210. See supra notes 203-09 and accompanying text for a discussion support-
ing the Fifth Circuit's opinion.
211. See supra note 203.
212. See GDF Realty I, 362 F.3d at 289-93 (Jones, J., dissenting) (arguing
against aggregation of noneconomic cave species takes); NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1060
(Sentelle, J., dissenting) (arguing that biodiversity does not establish how takes of
fly substantially affected interstate commerce); Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 506 (Lutig, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that red wolf takes on private land was not type of economic
activity Lopez contemplated).
213. See supra note 75 for a discussion of McFarlands dissenting opinion;
supra notes 141-48 and accompanying text for a discussion on Judge Jones' argu-
ment that the Commerce Clause does not apply to non-commercial activities.
214. See Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 483, cert. denied, Gibbs v. Norton, 531 U.S. 1145
(2001); NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1041, cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937 (1998); Hickman, 179
F.3d at 230, cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1203 (2000); McFarland, 311 F.3d at 376, cert.
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Court's refusal to hear these cases, the Court may still be willing to
accept a relatively broad interpretation of the Commerce Clause
when an intrastate activity can be linked to interstate commerce
through its essentialness to a regulatory scheme colorably directed
at economic activity. 2 1 5 Moreover, the Court's decision to deny cer-
tiorari in the aforementioned cases could illustrate its reluctance to
battle with Congress on how Congress should address national
problems like large-scale species extinction.216
Nevertheless, GDF Realty Ilends substantial support to two pro-
positions. First, it further solidifies the economic regulatory
scheme mechanism as an analytical tool courts can use to establish
a noneconomic intrastate activity's substantial effect on interstate
commerce.217 Second, GDFRealty Ireintroduces deference into the
Commerce Clause analysis by applying a more deferential rational
basis standard of review to Congress' statutes when Morrison, al-
though purporting to apply the rational basis standard, seemed to
apply a heightened intermediate standard.21 In fact, the Fifth Cir-
cuit deferred heavily to Congress' findings regarding the impor-
tance of protecting endangered species and biodiversity. 219
An additional, more political aspect of the Commerce Clause
debate at issue that is worth mentioning is the real world conse-
quences of the ESA's take provision on land use, development
projects and property rights. 220 In GDF Realty I, the possibility of
denied, 538 U.S. 962 (2003); GDF Realty II, 362 F.3d at 286, cert. denied, 125 S. Ct.
2898 (2005).
215. See supra note 214 (noting Supreme Court's denial of certiorari).
216. See id. (denying certiorari).
217. See GDF Realty 1, 326 F.3d at 638-43 (applying economic regulatory
scheme to establish that Cave Species substantially affected interstate commerce).
218. See supra notes 55-57, 111-14 and accompanying text for a discussion on
the Supreme Court's standard of review in Morrison and the standard adopted in
GDF Realty I. It remains to be seen how the Supreme Court will treat the issue of
standard of review. It should be noted, however, that neither Lopez nor Morrison
dealt with activity considered essential to a larger economic regulatory scheme.
Moreover, the majority in Morrison simply stated that Congress' findings were not
dispositive and were to be evaluated. See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text
for a discussion on Morrison's consideration of Congress' findings. In GDF Realty I,
the court considered Congress' findings and found them adequate in terms of
establishing that the ESA is directed at economic activity. GDFRealty I, 326 F.3d at
638-40. Of note, the court did not assume that Congress' findings established a de
facto substantial effect on interstate commerce, but only that the ESA is directed at
economic activity. See id. (implicitly declining to hold that Congress' findings are
dispositive).
219. GDF Realty I, 326 F.3d at 638-40 (deferring heavily to Congress' findings
on importance and necessity of ESA).
220. See U.S. CONST. amend X (reserving all powers not granted to Congress,
states and people).
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killing a few tiny bugs stymied a large development project, even
though GDF took great pains to prevent and mitigate any takes. 221
Such unfortunate consequences elucidate the competing policy in-
terests at stake: long term goals of natural resource conservation
and consumption versus development interests, property rights and
personal economic gain. 222 As mentioned earlier, the Fifth Circuit
just barely adopted the aforementioned policy choice in GDFRealty
I, but this choice appropriately defers to Congress' policy choice
when it enacted the ESA in the first place.223
Notwithstanding political controversy, the Fifth Circuit has
made a solid case for Congress' jurisdiction over intrastate,
noneconomic activity when such activity bears an essential relation
to an economic regulatory scheme. 224 Normatively, because spe-
cies, ecosystems and natural resources will eventually be destroyed
if Congress cannot protect them with federal legislation, posing a
threat to public well being, the Fifth Circuit seems wise to allow
Congress a means to regulate such intrastate activity through em-
ploying the economic regulatory scheme mechanism.225 Whatever
one's feelings are about endangered species regulation and prop-
erty rights, it may be more prudent to encourage federal adminis-
trative agencies like the FWS to administer Congress' statutes in a
way that more adequately balances competing interests, rather than
hamstring Congress and its ability to protect our environment by
construing the Commerce Clause too narrowly. 226
John Gregory Koch
221. GDFRealty I, 326 F.3d at 624 (reciting action GDF took to avoid takes and
reciting consequences of FWS' agency action).
222. See id. (juxtaposing position of land developers and FWS).
223. Id. at 643-44 (recognizing importance of protecting biodiversity); see also
id. at 639 (citing congressional findings in 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (a)(1)); ESA, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1531 (stating that purpose of ESA is, inter alia, to protect species susceptible to
extinction because of increased demand for development).
224. See supra notes 149-214 and accompanying text for analysis supporting
the Fifth Circuit's use of the economic regulatory scheme.
225. See GDF Realty I, 326 F.3d at 643-44 (quoting Congress' conclusion that
unchecked development resulted in extinctions of species and implying that con-
tinued failure to protect species against development will result in continued ex-
tinctions); id. at 640 (agreeing with FWS' argument that failure to regulate en-
dangered species takes will result in piece-meal extinction); See Gunningham &
Young, supra note 2, at 247 (discussing dangers of species extinction and destruc-
tion of ecosystems).
226. Cf GDF Realty I, 326 F.3d at 62241 (implicitly choosing to broaden
rather than restrict scope of Commerce Clause, while admonishing FWS for some-
what inequitable enforcement of ESA in this case).
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